11 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. 53

Those familiar with Clayton Christensen's book The Innovator's Dilemma will quickly note that LegalZoom's trajectory appears to fit nicely within the book's disruptive innovation framework. This article maps LegalZoom onto the disruptive innovation framework in The Innovator's Dilemma, making key modifications along the way. It includes in this perspective the solution shop versus value-adding process business distinction, coupled with the fee-splitting prohibition and regulation of the unauthorized practice of law. It also discusses the distinction between low end market and new market disruption.

67 DePaul L. Rev. 705

Public corruption cases often feature tawdry tales of government officials receiving lavish gifts, over-the-top luxury vacations, and even cash in exchange for conveying a perceived official benefit to the giftgiver. One such case, McDonnell v. United States, featured scintillating tales of a governor receiving Ferraris, Rolexes, and ball gowns while hosting extravagant parties for his benefactors. No matter how dazzling the facts, however, the technical aspects of these cases also showcase issues with our federal criminal justice system.

92 Notre Dame L. Rev. Online 172

The Sixth Amendment's Counsel Clause preserves an accused's right to counsel. The mere fact, however, that a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command. Rather, defendants have a right to the effective assistance of counsel. This right is protected by Strickland v. Washington's two-prong ineffective assistance of counsel test. The United States Supreme Court recognizes that an accused enjoys this right before accepting a plea deal. Only recently, however, has the Supreme Court addressed the issue of effective assistance of counsel when an accused rejects (or, at least, does not accept) a plea deal, in the sister decisions of Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye.

92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1395

The Advisory Committee has now explicitly endorsed proportional discovery. This step addressed some of the discovery issues that the Committee has attributed to the previous structure of Rule 26(b), including courts not applying the proportionality factors and courts applying the factors without the “proportionality” label—issues that the Committee believed only furthered the purportedly rampant issue of over-discovery. This Note argues that the new Rule 26(b) is not likely to substantially further the Committee’s professed goals.